Wittgenstein and Torah-Form: Why Mitzvos Are Not Behaviorism
Shvilei HaChassidus | שבילי החסידות by Shvilei HaChassidus
Episode notes
In this seminar, we continue the central method of the series: there is no neutral reading, no neutral psychology, no neutral wholeness, and no “just doing.” Every position comes with assumptions, and every position is also responding to another position.
The seminar begins with a lecturer who attacks the modern idea that כוונה means inner religious feeling, sincerity, or התלהבות. His alternative is to reintroduce telos: mitzvos are not empty external acts, but Torah-forms with objective goodness. This lets him explain מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה: even imperfect mitzvah-action trains the person because the act itself is already good.
The problem is that this explanation risks becoming a kind of religious behaviorism. Behaviorism is powerful because it sees that repeated behavior, reinforcement, and external practice really do form patte ...